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SOME COMMON LAW FORMS OF
CONVEYING TITLE OF LAND
The student of law should know something of the an-
cient modes of conveyancing and common law forms of
transferring title to land. First as to the meaning and
significance of the term seisin.
SEISIN
This was a term of primary importance in early times
although it is not of so much importance at the present
time. But no one can fully understand the law of Real
Property without knowing what was, and what now is, the
significance of this term. Seisin originally meant posses-
sion. It probably had no connection with the phrase "to
seize" land or at least very little connection therewith.
It is more probable that it was derived from that which
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indicated possession or "to set," meaning that one who is
seised is one who, as we might say, is "setting on the land"
as when he was given the seisin he was set on the land.
So then at the time of William the Conqueror the common
phrase "to sit upon land" meant to possess it. Even
at the present day we speak of one in possession of land
as a "mere squatter" and not as one seised or in rightful
possession of the land. Seisin therefore was formerly con-
nected with the idea of quiet enjoyment so that a man was
seised or "set on" land when he was in possession to en-
joy it. This did not in all cases mean that he had the right-
ful possession or title but later it came to mean quiet pos-
session with a claim of a freehold estate in the land. If a
man had in his possession some article of personal property
he was seised and in possession of the same whether he
hdd the legal title to it or whether he had stolen it. Tlus
with land he who was in possession of land claiming a free-
hold estate therein was said to be seised of that land and
the rightful owner may have been disseised of it. So one
may be in possession of land claiming that right through or
with the consent of another who was acknowledged to
be the one having title to the same. In this case such
possession was said to support the seisin of the rightful
owner.
Seisin founded on possession and a claim of right or
title gives one a right or limited title even at the present
day, to wit; that which may be called a defeasable title.
Thus when land belongs to A, the mere fact that B ousts
A and takes possession of the land gives B a right to such
land which is good against all the world except A. Such
possession of B deserves and has the protection of the law
against all persons but A. If B is disseised by C, B may
bring an action against C and recover the possession of
the land from him. Likewise, in such case C can be made
to pay damages to B, his disseisee.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
FEOFFMENT
Before the passage of the-Statute of Uses in 1535 the
chief mode of making an original transfer of land was by
feoffment with livery of seisin. A feoffment was a
species of gift and either a life estate or a fee simple es-
tate was created by feoffment either with or without a
writing or what was called a "charter of feoffment."
The livery of seisin was effected by the donor and
donee going on the land; the words of gift were said or,
if there was a charter of feoffment, it was read by the
donor or his attorney. Subsequent to the statute of Quia
Emptores in 1290 this process of feoffment could not create
a new tenancy by way of subinfeudation but the feoffee
took the land subject to the same feudal burdens to which
it had been subject in the hands of his feoffor.
It was usual for the donor and donee to go on the land
and if the subject of the feoffment was land alone, a twig
or a bit of turf from the land was delivered to the feoffee
in the name of the seisin or transfer of the land conveyed.
If a house was situated on the land it was usual for the
feoffor to put the hasp or ring of the door into the feoffee's
hand. Feoffment, as a transfer of the title, might also take
place in view of the land conveyed if the feoffee made an
actual entry on the land while the feoffor was yet alive.
In making a feoffment it was possible for the giver to
impose conditions or to establish remainders. This might
even be done by word of mouth. However should anything
elaborate be provided, a charter or writing setting out the
same was made a part of the ceremony of feoffment.
THE FINE
The conveyance by fine was, in substance, a convey-
ance of land; in form, a compromise of an action. In most
cases the action was begun in order that the pretended com-
promise might be had and the possession and title to the
land thus transferred to the one who brought the action.
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At times however the compromise or settlement of
of the case was the end of a serious litigation. This pro-
cess was used largely for the transfer of some title to the
land vested in a married woman who before the fine or
finish of the action was examined as to such compromise
or transfer separate and apart from her husband to see
that she understood what she was doing.
COMMON RECOVERY
A common recovery was effected in somewhat the
same manner as the fine. It was not confined however to
the transfer of land by a married woman but was used
chiefly in later times to bar or defeat an estate tail. The
final outcome of a recovery was not brought about by a
fine or compromise settlement but by the one against
whom the action was brought purposely failing to defend.
The one bringing the action thereby procured the fee sim-
ple title to the land and after entry he, in accordance with
a previous arrangement, conveyed to the original tenant
in tail. Thus a tenancy in tail holding of the land was
transferred into a tenancy in fee simple and the original
intention of the donor in tail defeated.
INCORPOREAL THINGS
While the above were the chief modes of conveying
land at common law it was said that the transfer of incor-
poreal things "lay in grant" or could be conveyed only by
deed. Corporeal property or real estate could only be con-
veyed by livery of seisin.
In feudal times the lord's right to the services of his
tenant, who might be a tenant in fee, was called the lord's
seignory. This he might own in fee, he being seised of the
same not in demesne, but in service. While this seignory
of the lord could be conveyed by grant it was necessary
before the statute abolishing attornment in 1705, that the
220
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 221
tenant of the land should attorne to his new lord or ack-
nowledge himself bound by the feudal burdens to which
the land was subject.
IS IT SELF-EVIDENT THAT "ALL MEN
ARE CREATED EQUAL"?
Generally speaking and for most purposes is it not
true that "all men are created equal?" What meaning did
the signers of the Declaration of Independence intend to
convey by the use of that phrase? Certainly not that all
men are created physically, mentally, morally or spiritual-
ly equal, nor that their capacity to acquire wealth or to
merit the esteem and good will of their fellow-men is
equal.
What meaning then did they intend to convey? They
were dealing with govermental, legal, administrative and
political matters. Is it not probable therefore that their
intention was to speak of equality as pretaining to legal
rights, duties, obligations and privileges as created and
enforced by the government? In other words did they not
mean that in so far as the government and its machinery
is concerned, all men have, or should have equal political,
legal and govermental rights, obligations, privileges and
duties without regard to their diverse natural capacities?
While this was probably the meaning the framers of
the Declaration intended to convey did they believe it,
or were they acting hypocritically? Let us prefer to be-
lieve from what has followed in this country due in large
measure to their influence and that of their compatriots
and descendants, that their attitude was like that of the
one who said "Lord I believe; help though mine unbelief."
Concerning things which have been done to apply this
principal we note various advances. Rights have been ex-
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tended by the government to the people in regard to the
voting franchise and also in connection with legal and
financial matters. Before the Civil War, which as far
as the South was concerned was nothing more nor less
than a war to perpetuate the institution of slavery, it was
said that a negro had no right which a white man was
bound to respect. As a result of that war and as a means
to protect the liberty which had been extended to the negro,
the right to vote was also granted him. Let us hope that
we may not be involved in any future war, civil or foreign,
which may be instituted against us to force us to live up
to this principle of equality enunciated in our Declaration
of Independence.
In this connection certain citations that have been made
showing how the various states in a legal way discriminate
against women may be of interest.
GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN
The father is the sole natural guardian of minor child-
ren in Alabama,1 Rhode Island2 and several other states.
It is legally possible for a father in some states, as for ex-
ample Georgia3 and Maryland4 even to will away the cus-
tody of a child from its own mother.
Michigan,5 New Yorke and Massachusetts7 are among
the states where the father alone is entitled to the services
and earnings of a minor child. Iowa' and Minnesota9 are
among the states where the right to recover damages for
'Cases cited in Vol. 7, Encyclopedic digest of Ala. Reports, p. 914.
2Vetterlein, Petitioner, 14 R. I. 378; Grant v. Grant, 110 Atl. 70.
3Code, Sees. 3033, 3022.
4British Stats. in Force in Maryland, Coe's edition, p. 630.
5Reeder v. Moore, 95 Mich. 594; Yost v. Grand Trunk Ryv. Co.,
163 Mich. 564.6Gray v. Durland, 51 N. Y. 424; Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N. Y. 422.
7Hogan v. Pacific Mills, 158 Mass. 402; Tornroos v. R. H. White
Co., 220 Mass. 336.
sCode, Secs. 3471.9Gen. Stats., Sec. 7681.
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loss of such services in case of injury to the child belongs
primarily to the father. In Florida, when the death of
a minor child is caused by the negligence of another, the
father is permitted to collect' damages even for the "men-
tal pain and suffering" of the mother.' 0
BURDENS OF ILLEGITIMATE PARENTHOOD
PLACED UPON MOTHER
Although as to the legitimate child the law gives the
father greater rights than the mother, in the case of an il-
legitimate child, the existence of which is frowned upon by
society, the laws of many of the states leave the
father in the background and place the weight of responsi-
bility on the mother. For instance, in Idaho, Virginia and
Texas, there are no laws by which the unmarried mother
may demand aid from the father for the support of the
child."
MARRIED WOMEN'S DISABILITIES
Before a woman marries, the law presumes that she is
able to look out for herself. For instance, if she wants to
run a millinery shop, no one will hold an inquiry as to her
capacity to run it, but when she marries, the law in some
of the states, as in Nevada 12 and Texas, 3 requires her to
go through a complicated court procedure to determine her
capacity to carry on a business. Before marriage a wo-
man can contract and assume all kinds of liabilities and
obligations. As soon as she marries, the law of some of
the states takes her under its wing and classes her with
10East Coast R. R. Co. v. Hayes, 66 Fla. 589; Rev. Gen. Stats.
Sec. 4962.
"Children's Bureau Publication No 42, Legal Series" No. 2, pp.
30. 181, 231, 224. See also the absence of provisions in the codes for
these states.
12Rev. Laws, Secs. 2190-2194.
"Vernon's Texas Stats., Art. 4629 (a).
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persons under a "disability." This disability of married
women is still recognized in Nebraska,1 Michigan, 15 Flor-
ida,'" and other states, except that if a married woman has
property she may contract to a greater or lesser extent in
relation to her property.
There are certain documents which a married woman
has no power to sign and to which her signature would be
worthless,-at least so far as the law is concerned. Be-
cause it is not always easy to determine what she can do
and what she can not do legally, people are wary of trans-
actions with her, and this is a real hardship if she is in
business. As a New Jersey court has remarked, people are
charged with knowledge of the "dangers of a married wo-
man's paper."' 7
THE DOUBLE STANDARD OF MORALS
In Texas a husband is entitled to divorce his wife for
a single act of infidelity on her part, but a wife can not di-
vorce her husband for infidelity unless he has abandoned
her and is living in a state of infidelity.'
Minnesota is among the states where a wife has not
the same right to the chastity of a husband that a hus-
band has to the chastity of his wife.'9 According to the
United States Interdepartmental Society Hygiene Board,
there are less than fifteen states which define prostitution
as an act of the male as well as the female.2 0 In many
states, as in Michigan 21 and New York,2 the women are
punished while the men who employ them go free.
14Marsh v. Marsh, 92 Neb. 189.
"oEdwards v.McEnhill, 51 Mich. 160.
16Micou v. McDonald, 46 So. 291.
"First Nat'l. Bank of Freehold v. Rutter, 104; Atl. 138; 106 Att.
371.
"sVernon's Texas Stats. 4631.
")Krodssin v. Kessler, 60 Minn. 372.
20Letter dated April 3, 1922.
21Comp. Laws, Sec. 7774.
22Code Criminal Procedure, Sec. 887; People v. Breitung, City
Magistrate's Court, Borough of Manhattan, 4th District, 1921.
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WIFE'S SERVICES BELONG TO HUSBAND
In all of the states, except probably the eight com-
munity property states, the services of the wife belong to
the husband23 Therefore, in at least forty states, mar-
riage is not a partnership between equals, where each part-
ner owns his own labor. Nor is it a partnership where the
partners jointly own the property acquired by their mutual
efforts.
The average couple has no property at the time of the
marriage. The wife may spend the best years of her life
laboring in the home or assisting the husband in his busi-
ness; but if prosperity comes, all the property belongs to
him. Sometimes her property even in her clothes is lim-
ited to the use of them, because under the common law the
ownership of a married woman's clothes is in her husband,
and some states, as South Carolina 2' and Michigan,25 have
not materially changed this rule.
WIFE'S EARNINGS MAY BE HUSBAND'S PROPERTY
Much is heard about women being on a pedestal. But
in some of the states, as Zona Gale has said: "The pedestal
does not seem to be high enough to prevent a husband from
scaling it to collect his wife's earnings." In Georgia 2 1 the
common law rule that the earnings of a married woman be-
long to her husband is still in force. The law reports of
Georgia abound with cases where the husband has availed
himself of a profit from his wife's earnings. But in a
case where an aggressive woman undertook to bargain to
furnish her husband's services, the court solemnly scrut-
inized the contract to see if any question of force or peon-
age might be involved.2 7
23Schouler's Domestic Relations, 6th Edition, Secs. 47, 543, 678.
24Battle v. Columbia N. & L. R. R. Co., 70 S. C. 329; State v.
Pitts, 12 S. C. 180.25Smith - Abair, 87 Mich. 62; Mains v. Webber's Estate, 131
Mich. 213.26Ga. R. Co. v. Tics, 124 Ga. 459; Roberts v. Haines, 112 Ga. 842.2 7Atlantic Rd. Co. v. McDilda, 125 Ga. 468.
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HUSBAND CAN COLLECT FOR LOSS OF WIFE'S
SERVICES
As a result of the rule that the services of the wife
belong to the husband, he usually has the right to sue for
damages for injury to her. Suits of this kind are main-
tainable in Illinois, 28 Colorado, 29 Delaware 3 0 Nebraska,"
Michigan,32 Mississippi, 3 Missouri,3" New York,33 Ten-
nessee and other states. People who are inclined to con-
sider a wife's services as of no material value would per-
haps be surprised at the great value which the jury finds
such services to be worth when the husband is suing for
damages for their loss.
MARRIED WOMAN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS
RESTRICTED
Laws relating to property discriminate against mar-
ried women in many jurisdictions. Florida laws entitle
the husband to manage and control his wife's separate
property 7 Louisiana and other of the community property
states permit only the husband to manage and dispose of
the joint property of husband and wife.38 In Michigan
the husband has the sole right to the rents and profits from
land held jointly by husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety and this is true even though the wife paid the
entire purchase price of the land. 9
"-Chicago & Milwaukee Electric Co. v. Krempel, 116 Ill. App 253.
29Colorado Mortgage & Investment Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Col. 538.
B0Townsend v. Wilmington City Ry. Co., 78 Ati. 635.
3 1Omaha R. R. Co. v. Chollette, 41 Neb. 578; Riley v. Lidtke, 49
Neb. 139.32Burns v. Township of Van Buren, 218 Mich. 44.
33Brahan v. Meridian L. Ry. Co., 121 Miss. 269.
34Womach v. City of St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467.
35Blaechinska v. Howard Mission, 131 N. Y. 497.
aGCity of Chattanooga v. Carter, 182 Tenn. 609.37Rev. Gen. Stats. Sec. 3948.
3sLa. Civil Code, Art. 2404; Nixon v. Brown, 214 Pac. 524.
39Morrill v. Morrill, 138 Mich. 112.
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INHERITANCE LAWS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST
WOMEN
The laws of the District of Columbia,'0 , Idaho," Mary-
land42 and New York,4 8 prefer men to women in granting
administration on the estates of decedents. In Arkansas,"
West Virginia, 45 and a number of other states, the father
inherits to -the exclusion of the mother when their child
dies without a will and leave no descendants.
In New Mexico46 and Nevada,7 all property acquired
after marriage by the industry of the husband or wife is
their common property and when the husband dies he may
leave his half to whomever he pleases, but on the other
hand, unless a wife outlives her husband, it is a general
rule that she cannot leave a dollar of her half to any one,
not even to her own children.
WOMEN DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN PUBLIC
OFFICE OR POLITICS
Iowa permits male citizens only to be members of the
legislature.48 In seeking positions or office, women find
themselves at a disadvantage because of sex. Always in
the government service whether state or federal, men are
given the preference in appointments.
Women school teachers who perform the same service
as men teachers are practically always paid less for their
services as there are only a few states which have laws
prohibiting such discriminations. For instance, in the high
schools at Providence, Rhode Island, the men teachers are
paid $300 to $400 per year more than the women teach-
4°Code, Sec. 281.
"1Cornp. Stats. Sec. 7488.
42 Code, Art. 93, Secs. 27 and 29.
43Surrogate Court Act, Sec. 118.
44Crawford & Moses Digest of Ark. Stats., Sec. 3471.
4"Barnes W. Va. Code, Ch. 78, Sec. 1.
4"Stats., Secs. 1840-1.
47Rev. Laws, Secs. 2164-5.
'8Const., Art 3, Secs. 4 and 5.
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ers. 9 Moreover under the school regulations the marriage
of a woman means forfeiture of her position in many
schools.50
WOMEN INELIGIBLE FOR JURY SERVICE
In more than half of the states women are denied the
right to serve on juries. Among these states are Arizona,5
Colorado,52 Connecticut, 3 Massachusetts,"' Missouri,5 New
Hampshire, 6 North Carolina,' 7 Oklahoma,8 and Wyoming."9
DISCRIMINATION IN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
Under the citizenship laws of the United States in-
cluding the Cable Act, women are denied equal right with
men. For instance, if a native American women citizen
married to a foreigner resides continuously for five years
abroad, or if she resides for two years in the foreign coun-
try of which her husband is a citizen, it is a legal presump-
tion that she has ceased to be an American citizen unless
she takes affirmative action and presents to the authorities
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. On the
other hand, a native American male citizen married to a
foreigner, may reside continuously in a foreign country
any number of years and he is still presumed to be an
American citizen. In fact he is never deemed to have ex-
patriated himself unless he has actually taken an oath of
allegiance to a foreign country or has been naturalized in
41Letter dated Nov. 1, 1923 from Supt. of Public Schools for
City of Providence.5OSec. 6, Ch. 5, Rules School Committee for City of Woonsocket,
R.I.
5'Code, Sec. 3516.
52Const., Art. 3, Sec. 23.
-G. S., Sec. 5681.
5
4 In re Opinion of the Justices, 130 N. E. 685.
55Const., Art. 2, Sec. 28.
56Laws of 1921, Ch. 144.
51Const., Art. 1, Sec. 13.
5SConst., Art. 2, Secs. 18 and 19.
59McKinney v. State, 30 Pac. 293.
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a foreign country in conformity with its laws. Moreover,
an American woman marrying an alien ineligible for Amer-
ican citizenship loses her American citizenship, but on the
other hand, an American man who marries a woman in-
eligible for American citizenship, continues to be an Ameri-
can citizen, entitled to all the rights and privileges such a
status confers. 0
It would thus appear that the principal of equality, as
declared and set forth in the Declaration of Independence,
is not fully carried out, or lived up to in this country.
G0The Act "relative to the naturalization and citizenship of mar-
ried women" passed by the 67th Congress.
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MOOT COURT
MAIN VS. FIRST NATIONAL BANK
Banks and Banking-Checks-Presentment-Deay-Negotiablo In-
strument Act of 1901, P. L. 194.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant bank drew checks on the E Bank in England and
placed money with the A Company, which telegraphed E to pay
the checks and debit the A Company's account. The A Company had
a sufficient balance with the E Bank until after a lapse of a reason-
able time for presentment, but before presentment the A Company
became insolvent, and its balance was withdrawn from the E Bank.
On presentment the E Bank refused to pay the checks. The plain-
tiff, accommodated payee of the checks, after demand and refusal,
sued the defendant for the amount of the checks. The bank claims
that it is relieved from liability under the Negotiable Instrument Act.
Swaboski, for Plaintiff.
H. Johnston, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Wiest, J. The plaintiff, the accommodated payee of several
checks, failed to present for payment the checks drawn on a bank,
which, during a reasonable time for presentment, had sufficient funds
in its possession belonging to the depositary of the defendant's
depositary. The depositary became insolvent before the present-
ment of the checks and its account was withdrawn from the drawee
bank.
The question presented for our determination is, "Did the failure
to present the checks for payment within a reasonable time relieve
th drawer, the defendant bank, of liability?"
When the First National Bank placed money with the A Com-
pany, the deposit created a debt, not a bailment. The title to the
money deposited passed from the First National Bank to the A
Company, and the A Company became the First National Bank's
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debtor. In re Prudential Trust Company, 223 Pa. 409; Northern
Liberties Bank vs. Jones, 42 Pa. 536. The facts do not disclose a
special deposit, any kind of bailment, or a trust, and in the ab-
sence of such facts, we must presume them not to exist. So far as
we can see, it was a common, ordinary business transaction similar
to many which occur every day in the world of commerce. Hence,
by the weight of authority, the A Company's insolvency gave the
First National Bank no right to any preference, but made it share
pro rata with the general creditors. In re Purl, 147 Mo. A. 105;
125 S. W. 849: Butcher vs. Butler, 134 Mo. A. 61; 114 S. W. 564;
Raban vs. Cascade Bank, 33 Mont. 413, 417; 84 Pac. 72: Bruyan vs.
Middle District Bank, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 413; Matter of Franklin Bank,
1 Paige (N. Y.) 249; N9 Am. D. 413: Blackwell Bank vs. Dean, 9
Okla. 626; 60 Pac. 226. It is therefore clear that the First National
Bank would be damaged by Main's failure to present the check for
payment before the A Company's insolvency, were Main allowed to
rover the face value of the checks.
Sec. 186 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, Act of May 16, 1901,
P. L. 194, declares that a check must be presented for payment
within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be dis-
charged thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. This
was applied in Heralds of Liberty vs. Hurd, 44 Pa. Super. Ct., 478.
The able counsel for the plaintiff contends that the burden of
proof is upon the defendant to show that he has been injured by
the delay in non-presentment. He cites Rosenbaum vs. Hazard, 233
Pa. 206, followed by the court in McKinley vs. Wainstein, 74 Pa.
Super. Ct. 490, to this effect: (1) In an action by the holder of a
check against the drawer, brought nearly six years after the check
was drawn, where the defendant in his affidavit of defense, makes
no averments of loss and in no way shows that he has been injured
by the delay in presenting the check there is no burden on the plain-
tiff to prove that the defendant has suffered no loss. (2) To hold
otherwise would be to require the holder to prove a negative, as to
a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the drawer.
Let us consider this question thorougly, for upon the answer to
it, we believe, turns the decision which must be made in this case. We
affirm the doctrine that it is necessary for the defendant to show his
loss caused by the delay of the plaintiff, but we hold that it is in-
cumbent upon him so to do only where the facts of the case as
presented by the plaintiff do not show such loss. The facts of this
case as they are presented to us do not show what was contained in
the defendant's affidavit of defense. But the fact remains that he
did suffer a loss. Whether that was shown by the plaintiff or by the
defendant we do not know. If the plaintiff proved non-payment
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by the E Bank in England because the A Company, the defendant's
depositary, became insolvent during the plaintiff's own delay, he can-
not be heard to complain that the defendant did not prove his loss.
The court infers that he has been injured by reason of his debtor's
insolvency, or at least would be injured if the court would allow the
full amount of the plaintiff's claim to be recovered. We do not
know how great was the defendant's loss, but whatever it was, it
must be deducted from the face value of the checks and the plaintiff
will be allowed to recover the remainder.
The case therefore will be remanded to the court below for its
reconsideration in accordance with the principles and directions here-
in set forth, costs to abide the outcome of the proceedings.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Many cases can be found holding that the insolvency or bank-
ruptcy of the drawee causing a loss because of delay in presentment
that would not have occurred had the presentment been timely, re-
lieves the drawer pro tanto. But there is no such wealth of au-
thority on the present situation. By a literal interpretation of the
Act, the same result will be reached. The insolvency of the A Com-
pany causes the same loss as would have been occasioned by the
insolvency of the E bank. The only efficient reason that has been
suggested for not relieving the drawer is that it thereby increases the
risks taken by the holder. But this risk is not taken if there is no
delay on his part. In the absence of a controlling authority so
holding, we feel that the drawer should be relieved to the extent of
the loss suffered. Heralds of Liberty vs. Hurd, 44 Super. 478, has
been cited as upholding the contrary view but it merely decided that
the loss was occasioned by the act of the drawer in settling partner-
ship accounts as though the check had- been paid when he should
have known that it was still out-standing. See Ferrari vs. Bank of
Connellsville, 216 N. Y. Supp. 280 for contrary holding.
The opinion of the learned court below has disposed of the other
issues involved and the judgment is affirmed.
BATES VS. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
Insurance--Contracts-Construction-"By His Own Hand or Act"--
Accidental Death.
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by the E Bank in England because the A Company, the defendant's
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
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insured died by accidentally taking a dose of carbolic acid in mis-
take for medicine. This is an action by the beneficiary to compel
payment of the insurance.
Yarmov, for Plaintiff.
Wesler, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Walls, J. The determination of the question under consideration
depends upon the construction of the clause, "die by his own hand
or act," as contained in the policy of insurance in question.
Undoubtedly the weight of authority in this country is in sup-
port of the theory that the words so used in a policy of insurance or
similar expression shall be deemed to mean and to be synonymous
with "Suicide." Eastbrook vs. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 54 Maine
224, Hartman vs. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466.
The words contained in the clause should not be interpreted in
their literal sense, but should be interpreted as applying to an in-
tentional self killing and not to death occassioned by accident or
mistake. Evans vs. Phoenix Asso., 1 Pa. Dist. Rep. 27, American
Life Ins. Co. vs. Isett's Adm., 74 Pa. 176.
In American Life Ins. Co. vs. Isett's Adm., 74 Pa. 176, a case
very much like the case at bar, the condition of the policy was:-
in case the assured should "die by his own hand" . . . this policy
should be void, null and of no effect. The court in affirming the
decision of the lower court held, "If the insured possessed sufficient
mental capacity to form an intelligent intent to take his own life
and was conscious that the act he was about to commit would
effect that object, it avoided the policy. If however he was uncon-
scious of the effect of his action upon his life, a recovery can be
had."
The leading case in this country on this point was decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Life Ins. Co. vs. Terry,
15 Wall. 580. There the condition in the instrument was that if
the assured shall "die by his own hand" the policy should be void.
In that case George Terry died from the effects of taking poison.
The court held that if the death was caused by the voluntary act
of the assured, he not knowing or intending that death would be
the result of the act, the insurer should be held liable. This case
was quoted and the doctrine laid down by it approved by Mr. Jus-
tice Woodward in Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Groom, 86 Pa. 92.
The case of Pollock vs. U. S. Mutual Accident Asso. 102 Pa. 230
cited and relied on by the learned counsel for the defendant should
not rule this case. While that case may well stand on its peculiar
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facts, we think the present case is clearly distinguished in its con-
trolling facts and principle applicable to them. In that case Pol-
lock was insured against, "injuries effected through external, violent
and accidental means," the certificate further declared that the
benefits under it, "should not extend to any death or disability which
may have been caused by the taking of poison." Mr. Justice Sterret
in Pickett vs. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79, in speaking of the above case
says, "In deciding that case, this court never could have intended
to lay down the broad rule, that in construing an accident policy there
is no distinction between 'external, violent and accidental' causes of
death and those cases in which death results from 'voluntary' acts."
Again, in Evans vs. Phoenix Mutual Relief Asso. supra, Hemp-
ill J., in commenting on the Pollock case, states, "The decision in
that case, is based upon the terms of the contract which expressly
excepts death.'by taking of poison' from the benefits of the Asso."
From the above comment it will be seen that the doctrine
of Pollock vs. U. S. Mutual Accident Asso. supra, must be confined
to cases where the same clause and facts appear.
"Suicide" obviously can mean nothing more than the taking of
one's life purposely and intentionally. To go beyond this and to
relieve the Insurance Co. from all liability in all cases where the
acts of the insured, without design on his part, caused his death
would in most cases render life insurance policies of very little value
to the insured.
It would not be a fair interpretation of this clause to hold it
to cover the case of a purely accidental death from the taking of poi-
son, though the hand of the insured may have been the innocent
agent by which the poison was conveyed to his lips. It is fair to pre-
sume that such an accident was not intended by the parties to the
policy, to relieve the company from liability. The insurance was
intended to stipulate against "Suicide," but who will contend that
the taking of poison by mistake though it result in death is what
is ordinarily understood as "Suicide?"
Certainly the language of the policy admits of the construction
we have placed on it and even if the construction contended for by
the learned counsel for the defendant, were equally reasonable, that
must be adopted which is most favorable to the assured. Evans vs.
Phoenix Mutual Relief Asso., 1 Pa. Dist. Rep. 27, Western Insur-
ance Co. vs. Cropper, 32 Pa. 351.
Judgment must therefore be for the Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
No Pennsylvania decision is available which directly adjudicates
the issue here involved. But courts invariably have construed the
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words "die by his own hand or act" to be synonymous with "suicide."
Nor do we feel that this is a strained construction. If the parties
wish to exclude accidental deaths they may do so in unequivocal
words.
The cases cited by the learned court below, while not controlling,
clearly portray the attitude of our courts in similar circumstances.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
FLACK VS. JOHNS
Contract-Actions-Measure of Damages-Evidence-Value of
Services
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Flack and Johns entered into a verbal agreement, whereby Flack
was to contribute his services in procuring a sale of land to Johns,
who was to resell the land, and give Flack one-half the profits in
return for his services. Johns, by means of Flacks' services, was
enabled to buy the land, but he then repudiated the contract and re-
fused to sell the land, although made an offer of $100,000 above the
cost. Flack sued for an interest in the land, but the court held
the action barred by the Statute of Frauds. He then began the
present suit for breach of contract, seeking to recover the value of
his services. He sought to introduce the contract as evidence of
the value of his services, and sought to show the possible re-sale
price. This was permitted, and he recovered $50,000. The defendant
has appealed.
Swartz, for Plaintiff.
Hyman, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ferraro, J. This is a suit by Flack to recover the value of
services performed by him in the sale of certain land, from a third
person to Johns, the apparent vendee.
From the facts, and the pleadings of this case, the first question
which arises for our determination, is as to the exact status and re-
lationship of Johns and Flack to each other. Were they partners in
this single transaction, or was their relationship merely one of prin-
cipal and agent?
The Uniform Partnership Act of March 22, 1915, P. L. 18, which
Act regulates the entire law of partnerships, in Sec. 6 defines a "part-
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services performed by him in the sale of certain land, from a third
person to Johns, the apparent vendee.
From the facts, and the pleadings of this case, the first question
which arises for our determination, is as to the exact status and re-
lationship of Johns and Flack to each other. Were they partners in
this single transaction, or was their relationship merely one of prin-
cipal and agent?
The Uniform Partnership Act of March 22, 1915, P. L. 18, which
Act regulates the entire law of partnerships, in Sec. 6 defines a "part-
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nership" as "an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners, a business for profit." From this definition it is
obvious that Flack and Johns were not partners, inasmuch as they
did not agree to carry on any business as co-owners of such. The
only semblance of partnership here, is the oral agreement to share
equally in the profits of a re-sale. A fortiori, in Section 7 several
rules are laid down for determining "whether a partnership exists,"
the first of which states that "persons who are not partners as to
each other are not partners as to third persons." It is readily ap-
parent that in this case neither Flack nor Johns ever regarded
themselves as partners. If this arrangement were a partnership,
the property purchased here would have become partnership prop-
erty and be deeded in the firm name . This was not so here, however,
since the deed to the property, as inferred from the facts, was made
in the name of Johns only, the vendee, and whom the vendor recog-
nized as such, and for whom Flack exerted his influence. Section 16
makes a person who holds himself out to others as a partner, a
partner "by estoppel," and liable as a partner. But here Flack
never represented himself as a partner of Johns, but was merely
acting for him to secure a purchase. Furthermore, if this plaintiff
and defendant were partners, plaintiff's remedy would have been in
equity, in the lower court, and not in law. We note from the -facts
that the lower court granted a verdict in damages to the plaintiff.
Therefore, it could not have regarded Flack and Johns as partners.
The jurisdiction of courts of equity over partnerships, is gen-
eral and unlimited. "Partnership accounts must be adjusted and
settled, and the liability of one partner to another ascertained by an
action of account render or by a bill in equity for an accounting:"
McCollum vs. Carlucci, 206 Pa. 312-1903.
As an analogy to the present case, Hart vs. Kelley, in 83 Pa.
286 (1877), holds that "one who has no interest in the business of
a firm or in the capital invested, save that he is to receive a share of
the profits as compensation for money loaned for the benefit of the
business, is not a partner and cannot be held liable as such by a
creditor of the firm."
From all this we see that Flack and Johns were not, in any
sense of the word "partners," and since not so, we must, by the
process of elimination, accept the relationship of principal and agent
as existant here, and that Flack was merely the agent for the pur-
chase of real estate for Johns. Therefore, we have a case of a
contract between one man, the purchaser, and the agent for him,
by which the purchaser agrees to give the agent, as compensation
for his services in securing the purchase, one-half the profits real-
ized upon a re-sale of this land bought.
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Now we are called upon to determine just what sort of right or
interest this plaintiff (the agent), acquired, on the completion of his
contractual obligations, i. e. the securing of the purchase of the land
to the defendant. If, from the terms of the contract, he acquired
a one-half interest in the land, he cannot recover here, because bar-
red by the Statute of Frauds (as so held in the lower court). How-
ever, the Act of March 22, 1772, "for the prevention of frauds and
perjuries," is limited in its operation to dealings between a vendor
and purchaser, or parties in a similar relationship, for the transfer of
land, and requires their contracts for the sale, etc. of same to be in
writing, or a memorandum thereof. As before stated, the contract
in the case at bar is betjveen the purchaser and his agent, and the
original contract between the vendor and purchaser, as encouraged
by this plaintiff (the purchaser's agent), has been fully executed. It
was the intent of both parties to the oral contract in controversy,
that the land, when bought, was to be re-sold, and in the profits
of that re-sale plaintiff was to have a one-half interest. Therefore,
an equitable conversion was to take place, and the realty was to be
converted to personalty in the form of cash. And in that personalty
would lie the interest of this plaintiff. Therefore, can it be said that
he had "an interest in the land" as so understood from the Act of
1772? He (plaintiff) did not want land; he wanted money, and this
was the understanding of both parties to the oral contract.
"An interest in contingent profits arising from the sale of land,
does not amount to an 'interest in land' within the meaning of the
Statute of Frauds." Benjamin vs. Zell, 100 Pa. 33. From all this
we see that the Statute of Frauds has no application to the contract
in the present case, inasmuch as the plaintiff had no interest in any
land, but did have an interest in the re-sale value of same, which
could be readily ascertained, and which, from the agreement of the
parties, was to be personalty and divided as such. (Cf. Davis vs.
Hillman (Pa.) 135 Ati. 254.)
The re-sale of the land in question was a vital term of this
oral contract. Of the several ways in which a contract is discharged,
"breach of a vital term" is one of the most prevalent. By the de-
fendant's breach here, and his refusal to perform his part of the
contract, he will be unjustly enriched at the expense of this plaintiff.
The plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant, under an
express contract, which has been broken by the default of the de-
fendant alone. Can we justly say that the plaintiff cannot recover
here the very amount upon which he was induced to act for the de-
fendant? Apparently he was well acquainted with land values, and
performed his obligations in reliance on the defendant's sincerity and
promise to re-sell, and he should recover.
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The general rule is well settled that a party to a contract where
services are to be performed, upon the breach of the contract by the
other party, has two remedies open to him. He may sue upon the
contract, and recover damages for its breach, or he may ignore the
contract, and sue for services and labor expended, and expenses in-
curred, from which he has derived no benefit. Kearney vs. Doyle,
22 Mich. 294. In case he pursues the latter remedy, the measure of
damages as to services is not necessarily the contract price, even
though the value of the services can be measured or apportioned
by the contract rate; but he may recover what his services are rea-
sonably worth, although in excess of the rate fixed by contract.
Hosmer vs. Wilson, 7 Mich. 294.
Where the party suing is not responsible for the breach, neither
the right nor the amount of the recovery depends upon the measure
of benefit received by the party guilty of the breach. The test is:
the reasonable value of what the plaintiff has done. The rule laid
down by Christiancy, J., in Hosmer vs. Wilson, supra, is that: "The
defendant having appropriated and received the benefit of the ser-
vices (or, what is equivalent, having induced the plaintiff to expend
his labor and services for him, and, if properly performed according
to his desire, the defendant being estopped to deny the benefit) a
duty is imposed upon the defendant to pay for the services thus per-
formed." In this connection, Hemminger vs. Western Assurance
Co., in 95 Mich. 355, is also authoritative.
It is apparent from the argument of the plaintiff here, that he
has elected to recover upon the quantum meruit, on the theory that
defendant "had violated the contract and prevented its completion."
The law is well settled on cases of this kind where the plaintiff
has fully performed. "Where one is employed to render services,
and fully completes his contract, and the other declines to carry out
the provisions as to compensation, or fulfill other conditions in the
contract, suit may be brought and recovery had on a quantum meruit
for the services." Coeus vs. Marousis, 275 Pa. 479 (1923).
The lower court was correct in admitting this contract between
the parties as evidence to measure the value of the plaintiff's ser-
vices, and its position must stand. As was said in Brown vs. Foster,
51 Pa. 165, "the services having been completed and accepted before
suit was brought, it was admissable to sue in indebitatus assumpsit
and give the special contract in evidence, not as proof of the promise,
but a rule to measure the damages for its breach."
This ruling is reiterated in Wilson Co. vs. Reighard, 230 Pa.
141 (1911) which holds that "in an action to recover for labor and
materials, where the statement of claim contains the common counts
in indebtitatus assumpsit and on a quantum meruit, and a detailed
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statement of the work done and materials furnished, the plaintiff is
not defeated of his right to rec6ver because at the trial he proves an
express oral contract."
As to the correctness of the court below in admitting evidence
as to the re-sale value (an offer of $100,000), we are governed by
the general rule, which, stated broadly, is that "in an action for breach
of contract, any evidence bearing directly upon the damage occasion-
ed by the breach, and tending to establish a legitimate element of
damage, is admissable; and as all damages which the parties can
reasonably be presumed to have contemplated as the probable con-
sequence of the breach are recoverable, evidence therof is admis-
sable. The evidence must, of course, be confined to matters relevant
to the contract in suit." 17 C. J. page 1028.
Where it is shown that a loss of profits is the natural and prob-
able consequences of the act of omission complained of, and their
amount is shown with sufficient certainty, there may be a recovery
therefore." 17 C. J. page 786. Here an offer of $100,000 was shown
to a certainty, thus proving the amount of profits to which plaintiff
would have been entitled.
In order that there may be a recovery of profits lost by reason
of a breach of contract, the profits must be such as were within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.
Cornelius vs. Lytle, 246 Pa. 205 (1914).
. Therefore, inasmuch as there is no error in the rulings of the
court below as to the admission of the oral contract and the re-sale
value of the land, in evidence and inasmuch as the defendant has
received a benefit from the plaintiff, and the retention of the benefit
by the defendant is inequitable under all the circumstances of the
case, we are constrained to affirm the decision of the court below,
and dismiss this appeal.
Judgment affirmed for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
In such a case as this, the defendant being at fault, recovery may
be had either on the contract or in quasi-contract for the reasonable
value of the services rendered, Wilson Co. vs. Reighard, 230 Pa. 141.
But whether the recovery be on the contract or on one construct-
ed by the law, the recovery allowed by the courts below is in-
correct. To allow the recovery of $50,000 in the present case is to
enforce the contract specifically. This the court has refused to do
in a prior action. It would be highly inconsistent to allow it by a
mere change in form of action. Cf. Breniman vs. Breniman, 281 Pa.
304 and cases therein cited for the attitude of the court on such en-
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deavors. The contract may be shown but the offered price of $100,-
000 is irrelevant as bearing on the value of the services. Only what
is considered a reasonable value as the remuneration of an agent in
negotiating a sale of real estate may be allowed. No evidence of the
value of the services was offered in the court below and judgment n.
o. v. should have been entered.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed and judg-
ment is here entered for the defendant.
SCOTT VS. HARLAN INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Insurance Companies--Liability For Negligence of
Agents-Death Before Consummation of Policy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Application was made by Scott for insurance to Roemer, agent
of the insurance company. The agent negligently failed to forward
the application, and the applicant died before action was taken on
the application, although according to the company's usual course
of business action would have been taken before the death oc-
curred. The wife of the deceased applicant, as executrix of his es-
tate, sues the insurance company in trespass, alleging the agent's
negligence as a ground for recovery, and showing-that the deceased
was in such physical condition at the time of the application as to
be an acceptable risk.
Yosko, for Plaintiff.
Larimer, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Woodside, J. The only question for the court in this case is
whether there was a right violated by the defendant. In other
words, whether the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff.
That the executrix is the proper party to bring suit; that the suit
is brought against the proper person; that the agent was in fact the
agent of the insurance company; that the agent acted negligently;
that the deceased was an acceptable risk; that the application of the
deceased would have been acted upon by the company before the
death except for the neglignt delay of th agent; and that there is
no liability upon a contractual theory has either been found as a mat-
ter of fact or has been admitted by both parties to this action.
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The plaintiff seeks to recover in a tort action. In order to
recover in tort there must be two things shown. First, that a legal
duty was owed the defendant by the plaintiff, and second, that that
duty was violated. If an insurance company, through its agent,
owes a duty to an applicant for insurance to act upon that applica-
tion within a reasonable time, then there is no doubt thai this duty
has been violated in the case before us.
A suit of this kind i6 unique in Pennsylvania. Neither counsel
was able to cite a case of a similar action in this State, and a
search through the reports by the court was marked with no greater
success. It thereupon falls upon us to decide the case on the general
rules of tort actions, the precedents that can be found in other
states, and inferences that may be drawn from Pennsylvania cases.
The question arises whether insurance companies are to be con-
sidered as a new member of this class of "public servants," and a
greater duty imposed upon them than is imposed upon an individual
contractor. It is the opinion of the court that they are at least of
a quasi-public nature, and for some purposes to be considered as
a member of this class. The Pennsylvania legislature has recognized
them as such, as is clearly indicated by the regulations and control
which they have assumed over insurance companies by statutes and
through the insurance commissioner.
In Heaven vs. Pender, 11 Q. B. D. 503, the English courts de-
fined when liability arises in tort as follows: "Whenever one per-
son is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to an-
other that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once
recognize if he did not use ordinary skill and care in his own con-
duct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of
injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use
ordinary case and skill to avoid such danger." Applying this def-
inition to the present case it is the opinion of the court that the de-
fendant would be liable. But so would an individual who delayed
in entering into many other kinds of contracts be liable for such
delay, and yet the rule is that a person cannot be held liable for de-
lay in entering into a contract. But, again, there is an exception to
this last rule in cases where the party wh6 delays in entering into
the contract is doing business of a public nature. It is on this
ground that insurance companies have been held liable in other
states where cases have arisen with facts similar to the one before us.
A review of the authorities on actions similar to this one has
brought the court to the conclusion that the weight of authority
is clearly on the side of the plaintiff in this case. It is true that in
two states, Arkansas and Alabama, the opposite view is held; but in
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Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Kentucky it has been held
that insurance companies are liable in tort actions for the negligent
delay of their agents in forwarding applications for insurance.
A recent case in Oklahoma (1922) reviewed the law on the
subject very thoroughly and held that: "An insurance company is
chargeable with the negligence of an agent in failing for an un-
reasonable length of time to forward an application of insurance for
acceptance or rejection. . . . Insurance companies are held in law
to a broader legal responsibility than are parties to purely private
contracts or transactions."
As it appears to the court the principle argument of the counsel
for the defendant amounts to this: Pennsylvania courts have refused
to permit a party to recover in an action of assumpsit when an in-
surance company delays in acting upon the application of the party;
therefore the insurance company owes no legal duty to an applicant
to act upon that application within a reasonable time, but may de-
lay passing upon the application indefinitely without assuming any
liability for any injury caused thereby. This does not follow as is
shown by a review of the cases in the states where the applicant or
his personal representative are permitted to recover in tort actions.
As indicated above a Kentucky case held that with the same set of
facts there could be no recovery in an action of'assumpsit but there
could be in tort action; Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company vs. Neafus. It has been held in jurisdictions where re-
covery when action is brought in tort is allowed, that there can be
no recovery with similar sets of facts in actions of assumpsit: Win-
chell vs. Iowa State Insurance Company, 103 Iowa 189, 72 N. W.
503; Van Arsdale vs. Young, 21 Okla. 151, 95 Pac. 778. These cases
should be sufficient to show that this reasoning of the counsel for
the defendant is not sound.
A statement, unsupported by authority, is made by the counsel
for the defendant to the effect that there is no presumption that
a company would accept a risk even though it is a desirable one.
This is not the law; Duffy vs. Bankers Life Association, and cases
cited above.
The counsel raises one other argument worthy of consideration.
That is that the applicant for the insurance is under a duty to
inquire as to the action that is being taken on his application, and
he cited as his authority for the rule Insurance Company vs. John-
son, 23 Pa. 72, where on facts similar to the one at bar a suit in
assumpsit was unsuccessful. There are two things worthy of note
in drawing such a conclusion from that case. One is that the case
was decided in 1854, since which time change has taken place in the
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
law of torts and of insurance; and the other, that careful study of the
case will reveal that it was not decided upon that point, but rather
upon the proposition that there could be no inference of the approval
of the application.
For the reasons above the court concludes that it is the weight
of authority that the plaintiff should be permitted to recover; that
such decision is in harmony with justice and reason, and that
there is nothing in the existing laws of Pennsylvania inconsistent or
contradictory to such a rule. The court therefore decrees that the
plaintiff shall be entitled to recover the amount of the application,
that amount being the injury suffered.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The opinion of the learned court bel6w has adequately covered
the available precedents on the issue presented. The weight of
authority holds the Insurance Co. liable in tort for the negligent
delay of its agent, the nature of insurance warrants such a duty, and
no judicial decisions of Pennsylvania prohibit such a holding. The
judgment of the learned court below is approved and affirmed on
its opinion.
CONDON VS. TASS
Contracts.-Nonperformance-LegaI Obstacles-Intention of
Parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The lessee, defendant, in renting a frame store, covenanted to
rebuild, in case of fire. Thereafter a city ordinance was passed
forbidding the erection of frame buildings in that district. Fire
then destroyed the building. The lessee 'would have been compelled
to pay twice the anticipated cost to rebuild. He refused to rebuild,
the lessor did, and now sues the defendant for the cost of the
buildin.
Bukowski, for Plaintiff.
Spear, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
M. Cohen, J. The defendant's argument as to the validity of
the ordinance is superfluous, since the plaintiffs have not attacked
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or questioned its validity or questioned the right of the city to
create it in the exercise of its police powers. Therefore the court
discards it from consideration.
That an action cannot be maintained upon a contract the per-
formance of which is contrary to and inviolate of the legislation of
the State has been uniformly held-13 C. J. Sec. 26.
A distinction must be made, first of all between a case where
the happening of a certain contingency has rendered performance of
a contract more burdensome and a case where performance is ac-
tually impossible. An example of the former would be a case of
a building contract wherein the price of biulding materials was in-
creased so as to render performance burdensome, but not impossible.
An example of the latter case would be, as in the case at bar, where
performance is absolutely prohibited by the law.
Counsel for plaintiff argues that performance of the contract was
not impossible, but on the contrary, was possible, by building a
dwelling of another sort such as the brick building which the
plaintiff has himself caused to be built. But as the counsel for
defendant has pointed out, and as explained by Trickett on Land-
lord and Tenant, at p. 100, "to rebuild in case of fire" means to re-
turn premises to same condition as when leased. It is very true that
defendant might build a brick dwelling at double the expense-and
even a castle at many times the cost of the original frame dwelling-
but would that be putting the premises in their original status? Ob-
viously not. To decide otherwise would be to substitute or read
into the contract terms not contemplated by the parties at the time
of the formation of the contract. We do not think, therefore, that
the plaintiff's argument on this question is tenable.
It has been uniformly held in Penna. that where a party by his
contract creates a duty on himself, he is bound to make it good
notwithstanding he is prevented by inevitable necessity from per-
forming, 247 Pa. 242, 278 Pa. 250. But these are cases where
performance by the defendant is not actually impossible, but would
impose on him a great burden. In the case where defendant is
compelled to pay rent for a building useless because of the Volstead
Act the defendant could nevertheless inhabit the premises or use it
for other purposes, which, although not as profitable, thereby im-
posing on him a burden, is nevertheless not impossible of perform-
ance. But, in the case at bar to perform the contract would be to
directly violate the law and is thus rendered impossible of perform-
ance. Should then a defendant, who being willing to perform the
terms of his contract, but is prohibited from doing so by the law,
be subjected to an assumpsit for his failure to perform such con-
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tract? The law is well settled that he cannot be so subjected, but
that his contract is discharged, 247 Pa. 242.
The question may arise whether, the performance of the contract
being discharged because of legal impossibility, the plaintiff (lessor)
should be prejudiced to the extent of the value of the original frame
dwelling. The U. S. Circuit Ct. has held in a Pa. case appealed
to that tribunal, that where performance of the contract was rendered
impossible by statute, the contract would not be enforced but that
neither party to the contract shall be prejudiced, Odlin vs. Ins. Co.
of Pa., 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 433.
In Rooks vs. Seaton, 1 Phila. 106, which was a case very sim-
ilar, in facts, to the case at bar, the defendant (lessee) agreed to
erect on a lot a frame building within a specified period. Before
expiration of this period, erection of frame dwellinigs were prohibited
by ordinance. The court held that the defendant could not be com-
pelled to build the dwelling but that defendant was bound to satisfy
his covenant by paying the plaintiff in money, an equivalent for the
house to be erected.
In Louisville & N. R. Co. vs. Crowe, 157 Ky. 27, the court held
that where performance by the defendant was rendered impossible
by Act of Congress, plaintiff was entitled to recover a reasonable
value of the benefits received by the defendants less the value of
any benefits which the plaintiff has received.
However, as this court is not called upon to decide whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable value of the original
frame dwelling, we will refrain from expressing any opinion on this
point, and will conclude with the decision that the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover the value of the brick dwelling and accordingly
render judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
What did the parties mean by a contract to "rebuild?" If they
meant merely replacement by an equivalent structure, the contract
has not become impossible of performance by law. If they meant
to replace with a structure of similar design and materials, their
contract has become impossible of performance. The latter view
would seem to conform more nearly to the normal intention of
the ordinary lessee and has been upheld by respectable courts.
Lehmeyer vs. Moses, 127 N. Y. Supp. 253, Albers vs. Norton Co. (Ky.)
144 S. W. 8, Cordes vs. Miller, 39 Mich. 581, Am. Rep. 430. That
such is the view of the Pennsylvania authorities is suggested by
Battle Co. vs. Gas Co.., 47 C. C. 89, 97 affirmed in 261 Pa. 523 and
Monaco Boro vs. St. Rwy. Co., 247 Pa. 242. The contract being dis-
charged by the change in law relieves the lessee of all responsibility.
Judgment affirmed.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
BOOK REVIEWS
CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WITH SUPPLEMENT
BY JAMES PARKER HALL, 1927
Published by West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.
In 1913 this work, less the supplement, was published. It con-
tained over 1400 pages, and was the largest compilation then ac-
cessible and it is not too much to say that the selections were most
judicious. Possessed of this book, the diligent student of Consti-
tutional Law had the best possible equipment for the pursuit of his
investigations. This compilation has been widely used in law
schools, and by isolated students of constitutional law. The publi-
cation of 1926 contains unchanged, unaltered, the original collection
of decisions; but in addition, a supplenient of about 400 pages.
The number of added cases in this supplement is nearly one-third
the number of the 1913 edition. The compiler remarks, "As was
to be expected, the police power, taxation and the commerce clause
furnish the major part of the new matter." He adds, "The never-
ending judicial efforts to draw more accurately the elusive line be-
tween the powers of the states and of the nation, are also well
represented." Time was when the ordinary lawyer knew little, and
cared no more, for the Constitution of his country. There has, in
recent years, been a marked emphasis put on constitutional studies,
and a work such as this by Mr. Hall, is contributing to the impulse, by
making the leading decisions of the courts readily accessible, and
in a form that renders them more quickly intelligible. The book is
worthy of emphatic praise.
ARGUMENTS AND ADDRESSES OF JOSEPH H. CHOATE,
BY FREDERICK C. HICKS
The West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1926
For the publication of this book, the West Publishing Com-
pany, merits the gratitude of all who have admired and esteemed
Mr. Choate. The book opens with a memorial by Elihu Root.
The products of the genius of Mr. Choate follow, under the fol-
lowing classification; Forensic Speeches and Arguments; Addresses
on International Affairs; Addresses about Lawyers; Addresses on
occasions; After Dinner Speeches, and Political Speeches. The
book contains 1183 pages, is finely printed, and bound. The type
is clear. The possession of such a book must be coveted by the
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
large number of lawyers and cultivated citizens of all professions,
who through Mr. Choate's various activities, have grown acquaint-
ed with his learning as lawyer and publicist, and have admired the
grace and force of his style of thinking and expression. Mr.
Choate died in 1917. As the editor remarks, "he was born during
the administration of President Jackson * * * and he lived nearly
two-thirds of the years between the inauguration of Washington
and his own death. In collecting the speeches and other effusions
of Mr. Choate, the editor has performed a service to his country.
CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON EQUITY
By WALTER WHEELER COOK
'West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1925 p. XIX, 1179.
This book is an abridgment of a three volume case book by the
same editor. It was prepared in response to requests from a num-
ber of teachers who found the use of the three volume edition im-
possible or undesirable in their schools.
It is divided into six parts, as follows: 1-General Nature and
Scope of Equity; 2-Specific Performance of Contracts; 3-Re-
formation and Recission; 4-Benefits conferred under agreements
which have been wholly or partially performed; 5--Benefits con-
ferred under compulsion and under influence; 6-Benefits obtained by
the wrongful use of another's property.
The last three parts are principally composed of cases dealing
'with quasi-contractual obligations. Cases of injunctions are includ-
ed in the first part: Bills of peace and bills of interpreader are not
specifically included.
In addition to cases the book contains many excerpts from text
books and law reviews, and thus illustrates the modern tendency to
abandon the case method of teaching law in favor of the combined
case and text method.
It is very probable that no teacher of equity will find this book
entirely satisfactory. Its omissions and its emphasis as well as its
content furnish a fruitful basis of discussion and criticism. It never-
theless appears to the reviewer to be the best case book for the
teaching of equity which has been published.
The great majority of cases are American and recent. The notes
by the editor are both instructive and suggestive. The writings of
Ames, Langdell, Maitland, Stone, Hohfield, Beale, et al., are fre-
quently quoted.
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There is no agreement among teachers as to what should be
included in the course of equity. This renders the task of preparing
a case book very difficult. Commercial considerations will dictate
a compromise among conflicting theories, and compromises are not
apt to be satisfactory to enthusiastic advocates. Mr. Cook's book
is the most recent and successful effort to effect such a compromise.
